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IN THE SUPRFME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
, l:'TE CJ!,
i'' 1 .1 ir1

UTAH,
Liff/ Respondent

Case No. 19281

rAIJL Bl\I \N TUCKER,

Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for the
offense of Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony, in violation
of Utah Code Annotated §76-6-302 (1953 as amended) in the Third
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, Paul Brian Tucker, was convicted in a
trial by jury of Aggravated Robbery on May 10, 1983.
11as

Appellant

sentenced to the indeterminate term of not less than five (5)

··1ears to life in the Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction or, in the
:ilt,r1::itivec

d

new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

I.Jn
,,·•11e1inc'

Februarv 18, 1983, a man was robbed at gunpoint by

'""citing a bandana over his face, near the Little America

Motel located at 500 South and Main Street in Salt Lake City,
Utah.

Shortly after the robbery, two deputv sheriffs from Salt

Lake County were driving down 500 South when they observed a
person run out in front of their patrol vehicle (T.98).

The

deputies observed this person run into some shrubbery near
the motel and then exit the shurbbery and run across the street,
into an alleyway, out of their view (T.52).
The same person who was observed by the Salt Lake County
Sheriff deputies was also observed by a Salt Lake City Police
vice officer who happened by at the same time.

This vice

officer, who was just coming off duty (T.85), pursued the person
on foot down the alleyway, but the officer quickly lost all
contact with the fleeing person (T.88).

At all times the officer

were pursuing this individual, they were unaware of the robbery
which had taken place.
A short time after the Salt Lake City vice officer had las
sight of the person who fled into the alleyway, he came across
appellant lying in a vacant field which is adjacent to the 451
Club, a tavern located in the area (T.90).
After learning of the robbery, the police took the victim
of the robbery and his companion to the field where they had
arrested the appellant.

The appellant was handcuffed and

surrounded by uniformed police officers, and it was at this
point that the victim and his companion identified the appellant
as the perpetrator of the robbery (T.12,27).
The appellant was searched pursuant to this arrest and
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- 11<!11 ;11

,,,

Ii""

W.JS
1

I.ell-•

Jiscovering a common type bandana on his person, no

1n

found (T.22).
11, 1983, a line-up was conducted at the Salt

1;'' y Police station at which time the victim of the robbery

p1<'1·,.,d thP appellant out of a group of eight men,

as the

of the robbery.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE IDENTIFICATION OF APPELLANT BY THE
VICTIM OF THE ROBBERY WAS SUGGESTIVE AND
INVOLVED A LIKLIHOOD OF MISIDENTIFICATION
AND AS A RESULT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED.
During the commission of the robbery the perpetrator had
worn a bandana which covered most of his face (T.22) and the
entire incident lasted approximately fifeen to twenty seconds
(T.20).
About twenty minutes after the robbery, the victim was
transported by the police to the vacant lot where they had
discovered the appellant lying in the field (T.27).

At the time

he was presented to the victim, the appellant was handcuffed and
surrounded by uniformed police officers at which time the victim
identified appellant as the man who had robbed him (T.27).
The type of showup identification which was used in this
c;ise is generally disfavored and has been widely condemned as
;in inherently suggestive procedure.

Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S .

.'93 (1%7), United States v. O'Connor, 282 F.Supp. 903 [D.C.];
409 U.S.

188 (1972).
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In the Biggers case, the United States Supreme Court held
that where there existed a "likelihood of misidentification," the
defendant's due process right might be violated by admission by
the court of that identification.

Id. at 199.

The inquiry, as outlined by the court in Biggers, is
whether the eyewitness identification appears reliable as vieued
under the totality of the circumstances applying the following
five factors:

(1)

the opportunity of the witness to view the

criminal at the time of the crime;
attention;

(2) the witness' degree of

(3) the accuracy of the witness' prior description

of the criminal;

(4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the

witness at the confrontation; and,

(5) the length of time

the crime and the confrontation.
Applying the factors to the present action, it becomes
apparent that there exists a likelihood of misidentification.
A.

OPPORTUNITY OF THE WITNESS TO OBSERVE
THE CRIMINAL.

According to the victim's testimony the entire incident
lasted only about fifteen to twenty seconds, occurred late at
night, and the assailant had a bandana covering his face during
the entire incident.
B.

DEGREE OF ATTENTION.

Considering the nature of the crime, it would seem appareT
that the victim's focus would be on the gun and an escape route.
Indeed the victim's testimony reveals the following:

Q.

And I assume you had a gun pointed at you
and that you were mostly focusing on the
-4-

gun is that fair to say? I mean you
saw this gun in front of you.
''-

That is the first thing you notice, yes.

I I

·rt

1hus appears that the victim's attention was on the gun

d11r-i'"1g most uf

C.

the fifteen to twenty seconds of the robbery.
ACCURACY OF PRIOR DESCRIPTION.

This is perhaps the most telling of the factors in that
the record is devoid of any such prior description.

In fact,

of the three officers that testified at trial, none had talked
to the victim

prior to the time of the tainted and suggestive

showup.
D.

LEVEL OF CERTAINTY DEMONSTRATED BY THE
WITNESS AT THE CONFRONTATION.

During his examination the victim stated:

"They took us

I would say a block or so from the area where we were robbed to
where there were a number of police cars and alot of lights and
they had the fellow that robbed us standing there." (T.12).
The above statement by the victim is susceptible of two
readings:

first as demonstrating a high level of certainty but,

secondly, as showing the inherently suggestive nature of the
shnw11p and the conclusion which is based thereon.

The conclusion

of the victim seems to be based, not on any articulated specific
features of height, weight or coloring, but rather the conclusion
anJ its certainty seem based on light, police cars andfue fact
LILit

the: .q.Jpellant stands handcuffed alone in a sea of uniformed

,,_, L i_\_'C
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E.

THE LENGTH OF TIME BETHEEN THE CRIME
AND THE CONFRONTATION.

The testimony of the victim indicated approximately twent:
minutes.
It becomes apparent in applying the factors outlined in
Biggers, supra, that the eyewitness identification in this case
involves "a likelihood of misidentification."
People v. Thomas, 422 N.Y.S.

In the case of

2d 188 72 A.D.2d 910 (1979), the Ne1

York Supreme Court Appellate Division, in a case with very simil,
facts to the one before the court, stated that the defendant in
that case had been denied due process under the law as a result

of a suggestive showup, despite the fact that the showup was madE
in the field and done shortly after the crime as a part of the
investigation.

Much like the present action, that case involved

a victim who had a very limited opportunity to see the perpetrator's face.

That court, in reversing the defendant's conviction

stated:
The opportunity to view his assailants
during the crime was very limited.
Hence
it was very important that his pretrial
identification of his assailants not be
the product of unnecessary suggestion,
such as one on one viewing at the insistence of the police.
Id. at 190.

See also People v. Dolphin, 77 A.D. 2d 571, 429

N.Y.S. 2d 732 (1980).
Should this court agree that appellant's due process
rights were violated by this suggestive lineup, it should be
noted that the subsequent lineup under finer conditions cannot
remedy the defects.

Prior to the lineup held one month after
-6-

,,,

1 "''

c,ll(1\v11p
pi 11,i

... h,,

.l
I '1.-l:

<F<

the only time the victim had seen the appellant's
lo the lineup was the suggestive showup.
·1'1p

If the

,,as indeed tainted, it seems inconsistent to hold

lie remedied by a lineup.
Where a flawed pre-trial identification
occurs, the state is not entitled to use
:Jn in court identification with showing it
is not tainted by the prior identification.
Only a per se exclusionary rule can be an
effective sanction to ensure that law
enforcement authorities will respect the
defendant's due process rights during pretrial identification procedures.

.a

Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
California, 388 U.S.

See also Gilbert v.

263 (1967).

In the case at bar, appellant's counsel moved to suppress
the lineup as a result of the state's failure to lay proper
foundation as to its fairness and reliability (T.16) which
objection was overruled.

Since the state has the burden of

proving its reliability and the evidence shows that in fact it
was made under circumstances which were unnecessarily suggestive
and conducive to mistaken identification, appellant's due process
rLghts as guaranteed by the Utah and United States Constitutions
were violated and a new trial should be granted.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
BY REFUSING TO GIVE THE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION ON THE NATURE OF, AND REQUIREtlENTS FOR, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE.
ThP Jefense raised at trial was that the appellant was not
l he·

pe rsuti \·Jho committed the aggravated robbery.
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As a part of his

defense appellant requested an instruction which described the
dangers inherent in eyewitness identification evidence, the
factors to be considered in assessing the value of identification
evidence and the burden of proof with respect to that defense.
The trial court refused to give the instructionl and exception
was taken (T.110).
The dangers involved with eyewitness identification
evidence has been well documented in the literature, and numerous

The instruction requested provided:

INSTRUCTION NO.
Identification testimony is an expression or belief or
impression by the witness.
In this case its value depends on the
opportunity the witness had to observe whether or not the defendan·
was the person who robbed him.
In appraising the identification testimony of a witness,
you should consider the following:
1. Are you convinced that the witness had the capacity
and an adequate opportunity to observe the offender?
2.
Are you satisfied that the identification made by the
witness subsequent to the event was the product of his or her own
recollection? You may take into account both the strength of
the identification, and the circumstances under which the identi·
fication was made.
3.
Has the witness ever failed to identify the defendant'
4.
Is the witness credible? Consider whether he is
truthful, whether he had the capacity and opportunity to make a
reliable observation on the matter covered in his testimony.
I again emphasize that the burden of proof on the prosecutor extends to every element of the crime charged, and this
specificailly includes the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the
crime, with which he stands charged.
If after examining the
tesimony, you have a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the
identification, you must find the defendant not guilty.

-8-

J.,"1 1e·11e" articles have been written on the subject.2
Tl1c
1

/,CJt

i11struction which was offered by appellant in this case

framed by the United States Court of Appeal for the

Districl of Columbia in United States v. Telfaire,3 409 F.2d 552
(D

C.

Cir

1972).

This instruction was cited with approval by

--2-Did Your E es Deceive You? Ex ert Ps cholo ical Testimon
on the Unre ia i ity o Eyewitness I enti ication. 29 Stan.L. Rev,
91)9 (1977);
Due Process Standards for the Admissibility of Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 26 Kan. L. Rev. 461 (1978);
£Yewitness Identification Evidence: Flaws and Defenses, 7 No. Ky.
L. Rev. 407 (1980); Ellis, Davies,Shepherd, Experimental Studies
of Face Identification, 3 Nat. J. Crim. Def. 219 (1977); Use of
Eyewitness Identification Evidence in Criminal Trials, 21 Crim. L.Q.
161 (1979); Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (1979); Public Defender
Sourcebook, pp. 251-57 (S. Singer, ed. 1976); Yarmey, The Psychology
of Eyewitness Testimony (1979); Buckhout, Determinants of Eyewitness
Performance on a Lineup, 1974 Bull. Psychonomic Soc'y 191; Buckhout,
Eyewitness Identification and Psychology in the Courtroom, Crim.
Def., Sept.-Oct. 1977, at 5-9; Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony,
Scientific Arn., Dec. 1974 at 23; Ellis, Davies & Shepherd, Experimental Studies of Face Identification, Nat'l J. Crim. Def. 219
(1977); Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification:
The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1079 (1973); Luce,
Dimension in Eyewitness Identification, Crim. Def.,
May-June 1977 at 5-8; Tyrrell & Cunningham, Eyewitness Credibility
Adjusting the Sights of the Judiciary, 37 Ala. Law. 563, 575-85 (1976).
3
The Telf aire instruction specifically has either been
recommended or approved for use in numerous jurisdictions as
relfected by the following cases: United States v. Holly, 402 F.2d
273 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Hodges, 515 F.2d 650 (7th
Cir. 1975); State v.
363 A. 2d 162 (Conn., 1976); State
v. Calia, 514 P.2d 1354
Or. App. 1973); cert. den. 417 U.S.9TT
(1974): Commonwealth v. Rodri;uez, 391 N.E. 2d 889 (Mass. 1979);
United States v.
5 2 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978);
State v. Dodge, 538 F.2 770 (8th Cir. 1976) cert. den., 42·9 U.S.
rogq-(1977); United States v. Masterson, 529 F-:zcrCir.)
cc>n. den., 4L6U.S. 908 (1976); United States v. O'Neal, 496 F.2d
(6i:1\Cir. 1974), United States v. Fernandez, 269, 421 N.E. 2d
157 (1981), State v. Payne, 280 S.E. 2d 72 (W.Va. 1981); United
v. Cueto, 628 F.2d 1273 (10th Cir. 1980); People v. Guzman,
121 Cal. Rptr. 69, 47 Cal. App. 3d 380 (Cal. App. 1975); State v.
l'otes, 215 s.r:. 2d 190 (S.C. 1975); State v. Payne, 280 S.E. 2d 72
ITJ\Jq- 1981); State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Ut. 1982) (Stewart,
.I
issenting). State v. Warren, 635 P.2d 1263 (Kan. 1981).
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Justice Stewart of this court in his dissent in State v. Malmrose
649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982) and has been examined by this court on
numerous other occasions.

State v. Reedy, Utah, No. 18082, filed

April 26, 1984; State v. Newton, Utah, No.
1984; State v. Melmrose,

19065, filed April 23,

649 P. 2d 56 (Utah 1982); State v. Shaffer

638 P.2d 1185 (Utah 1981); State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah
1980).
The general conclusions that can be reached concerning this
courts stand on the necessity of a Telfaire-type instruction seemo
to be that under certain circumstances the identity instruction
would be proper, but that in the cases which have come before the
court there was no reversible error which could be found in the
trial courts refusal to give the instruction.
Appellant submits that the facts of this case dictate that
some cautionary instruction should have been given.

In this cour:

latest pronouncement on the need for such an instruction State v.
Reedy, supra, an analysis was outlined for determining the need
for such an instruction:
The central question remains whether "under
the totality of the circumstances the identification was reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive," Neil v.
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375 (1972).
Factors evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include the opportunity of the witness
to view the criminal at the time of the crime,
the accuracy of the witness' prior description
of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation,
and the length of time between the crime and
the confrontation.
Id. at 5.
-10-

As was seen in Point I of appellant's brief, the factors
<rntlined in Biggers, supra, as applied to the present facts
,,nnn:cly indicate that there exists a substantial chance of an
1mreliable identification.
Under the facts of Reedy, supra, as this court correctly
observed that there was "independant testimony by a police officer
of the defendants likeness to the photograph at the time of his
initial arrest .

[and] that the description given matched that

of the defendant when initially identified and arrested." Id. at
5,6.
In the case at bar, there exists no independent testimony
as to the identification, there was less than ample opportunity
to observe by the victim, and perhaps most importantly the record
is absent any description given by the victims prior to the
appellant's arrest.

It is hard to imagine a case where there

could be a greater need for an instruction describing what eyewitness testimony is, how it is to be evaluated and the burden of
proof it must meet.
Using the factors outlined by this court in Reedy, supra,
there exists in this case a substantial likelihood that a mistaken
identification was made.

Appellant submits that the great need

for a cautionary instruction combined with the trial court's
refusal to give any such instruction, constitutes prejudicial
error requiring a new trial.

-11-

POINT I II
COMMENTS BY THE PROSECUTOR ABOUT DEFENDANT'S
CHOICE NOT TO TESTIFY VIOLATED DEFENDA:;T' S
CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED PRIVILEGES AND
CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR.
In the landmark case of Griffin v. California, 350 U.S.
609 (1965), the U.S. Supreme Court held that comments by a
prosecutor about the failure of a criminal defendant to testify
can effectively abridge the defendant's Fifth Amendment right to
refuse to testify and, therefore, constitute reversible error.
That court reasoned that a rule which would allow a prosecutor
to comment "is in substance a rule of evidence that allows the
state the privilege of tendering to the jury for its
the failure of the accused to testify."

Id. at 613.

This court has expressly recognized the holding in Griffin
supra, and stated:
That a prosecutor has the duty and right
to argue the case based on the total
picture shown by the evidence or lack
thereof, including reference to the paucity
or absence of evidence adduced by the
defense.
But prosecutorial comment on a
defendant's refusal to testify may violate
a defendant's privilege against self
incrimination.
Trus a prosecutor commits
constitutional error when his statement is
manifestly intended or is of such character
that a jury would naturally and necessarily
contrue it to amount to a comment on the
failure of the accused to testify.
State v. Hales, 652 P. '.'d 1290 (Utah 1982); State v. Nomeland,
581 P.2d 1010 (Utah 1978), State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114 (Utah
1977 Utah); State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975).
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During his closing argument in the trial, the prosecutor,
;;,,>,,.n

Stott of the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, made the

f,,l lu•.ving argument:

MR.
the
was
why

STOTT:
She tells you that the reason
defendant was sweating, because a gun
pointed at him.
She doesn't tell us
he was in the field hiding, does she?

MS. CARTER (attorney for appellant):
Honor, I am going to object to that.
MR. STOTT:

Your

Also

MS. CARTER: The defense has no burden to
put on any evidence of anything.
MR. STOTT:
I didn't say what the defense
was.
I said she didn't say.
THE COURT:
Counsel, let's complete this
case.
Let me make the statement, of course,
that the burden is on the State to prove
the case.
The defendant does not have a
burden of proving his innocence.

MR. STOTT:

Thank you.
She didn't tell
you, did she, why he was on that --

MS. CARTER:
object.

Your Honor, I am going to

The COURT: Counsel.
I would again admonish
the jury and admonish you also that the State,
the defendant does not have the responsibility
of proving his innocence.
The burden is on
the State to prove the guilt.

At which point, argument by Mr. Stott continued (T.108).
Attorney for appellant following closing argument and out
of the presence of the jury made a motion for a mistrial based
on the prosecutor's comments.

The motion was denied by the trial

judge (T.109).

In light of this courts pronouncements on permissible
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argument by a prosector in such a situation,

the inquiry before

the court should focus on whether the prosecutor's comrnents
were "manifestly intended or of such a character that a jury
would naturally and nessarily construe it as a comment on the
failure of the accused to testify."

State v. Hales, 652 P.2d

1290 (Utah 1982).
It takes no legal reasoning but mere commonsense to
determine thatthe one and only thing the proseuctor was hoping
to achieve by his persistant questions as to the defendant's
counsel's failure to provide explanations was to plant in the
jury's mind the question: Why didn't the defendant take the
stand?

If he is really innocent, why didn't he take the stand

and tell us what he was doing in that field.
A logical reading of the argument presented by Mr. Stott
would indicate that it was both given by the prosecutor, and
taken by the jury, as a comment on the failure of the accused
to testify.

As such, it is an impermissible comment on the

appellant's absolute right not to testify or present any evidence.
In light of the limited amount of evidence offered against
the appellant in this case, it seems likely the jury might have
relied on these impermissible comments in reaching its verdict.
It is the possibility that these comments "could have affected"
the outcome which require a reversal of the trial court's verdict
State v. Wiswell,1639 P.2d 146 (Utah 1981).

-14-

CONCLUSION
Independently, each of Points I, II and III constitute
rP11cr,;ible error.

However, it is important to note that the

cr1mi1lative impact of such error clearly denied appellant a fair
trial.

The combination of the highly suggestive showup proceeding

which was presented to the jury without any instruction or
guidance and the improper conunent by the prosecutor or the
appellant's constitutional right to remain silent has effectively eviscerated appellant's right to a fundamentally fair trial.
He therefore respectfully requests this court to reverse his
conviction and grant him a new trial
DATED
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